I. Introduction
Military history contains many lessons from which the warfighting doctrine of the individual services, as well as joint doctrine, is derived. World War II stands as one of the major contributors of valuable lessons learned. From a joint and combined warfighting perspective, Germany's planning and preparatory military actions to the invasion of Great Britain after the fall of France are instructive. Their plan, called Operation SEA LION by the Germans, was never carried out, as certain prerequisite conditions were never achieved, and Hitler elected to move on to other operations. But Germany could have been successful in invading and, if necessary, occupying
Great Britain had they exercised joint and combined operations to achieve better unity of effort within the German military, remained focused on key British operational centers of gravity, and exploited the capabilities of friendly nations such as Spain, Italy, and the Vichy government of France.
II. Background

A. Political Situation
World ing to yield to German peace overtures and clinging to the hope that America would awaken from its isolationist stupor (1, 5) .
B. Military Situation
In the summer of 1940, Germany became the hegemon of Europe. The rapid defeat of Poland showed the world a new combat doctrine called blitzkrieg (lightning-war) that combined the effects of infantry, armor, and aircraft in a massive display of firepower and mobility. All doubts regarding mechanized warfare were eliminated when Germany defeated France. "On the even-ing of 20 May, (German General) Guderian's panzer divisions reached the Channel coast at the mouth of the Somme. The French northern armies and the BEF (British Expeditionary Forces) had been cut off" (17, 23) . The campaign continued into June, but the outcome was already decided in the first ten days. France, the best-equipped army in the world, had fallen victim to blitzkrieg, and the BEF had to flee by sea abandoning all its equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk (1, 15) .
The brilliance of the operational and tactical plans to defeat France was not fully appreciated or anticipated by Germany's strategic commanders. No plan existed to follow up a decisive victory. Even after the panzers reached the English Channel, no serious consideration was given to the need for a campaign plan that called for the invasion of England. For example, the Germans needed ships, yet in the euphoria of victory they made no demands regarding the disposition of the powerful French fleet in the surrender terms, nor were there considerations to seize any of these naval units (1, 106) . The German Commander in Chief of the Navy (Kriegsmarine), Admiral Raeder, recalled after the war, "Our mental as well as materiel preparations before the war had not been aimed at an armed conflict with England" (17, 82) . Therefore, Hitler hoped the rapid defeat of France would be enough to encourage Britain to agree to peace terms.
By July 1940 it was apparent that Britain had no intentions of surrendering. Indeed, Prime
Minister Churchill, in reference to a possible German invasion, had declared, "If the long history of our island is to come to an end, then it shall only end when every last one of us is beaten to the ground and lies choking in his blood" (17, 70) . In the face of British stubbornness, the Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) on 2 July 1940 issued orders to commence planning Operation SEA LION; the cross-channel amphibious assault on the beaches of England (9, 105). complete understanding of these aspects of the enemy, the probability of success is diminished.
III. Centers of Gravity
Of these characteristics, perhaps the most important to the success of a campaign or invasion plan is to understand the enemy's centers of gravity.
Centers of gravity (COGs) ought to be the focus of campaign planning at both the strategic and operational levels. Clausewitz described COGs in the military context as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." Joint doctrine defines COGs as "Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" (12, . Therefore, improper COG analysis can lead to expending limited military forces against enemy targets of little importance to the final outcome. Attacking COGs means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow is most likely to yield success with the minimum of effort. be considered a center of gravity. Ultimately, all would rest on who commanded the air and sea on both sides of the English Channel; thus, the RAF and Royal Navy would be the two centers of gravity posing the biggest challenge.
B. Enemy Centers of Gravity
C. The British Army
Even though some 215,000 British troops escaped in the near-miracle of the Dunkirk evacuation, much of their equipment, particularly the heavy weaponry, was necessarily left behind (3, 121 
D. The Royal Navy
While the British Army was in disarray after the evacuation from Dunkirk, the Royal Navy In addition to the Luftwaffe, Hitler and his staff were forced to place a lot of faith in coastal artillery (8, 32 ) and maritime minefields (8, 45) as "antidotes" to the Royal Navy. Ultimately, it
was not a reassessment of the naval risks but the failure to establish air supremacy that made
Hitler call off the invasion. All the evidence suggests that, had Germany won the air battle, Hitler's armies would have embarked and sailed according to plan. (8, 150)
E. The Royal Air Force
The most important center of gravity and hence the British "hub of all power and movement" was the RAF. For an invasion to be successful, German strategy required air supremacy and not simply superiority in the air over southern England, the Channel, and the Continental ports from which the invasion was to be launched (8, 235) . Perhaps more than any other aspect of the period, from Dunkirk to the end of the summer, German air strategy reflects the flaws in their understanding of this center of gravity (8, 213) . In particular, German failure to press successful strategies for degrading RAF radar, command and control, and other critical air defense systems indicates impatience in dealing with this key COG. fighters, were intercepted well out to sea and the force suffered losses so great that Germany never again attempted daylight operations over England from that approach (8, 228 ). England's left flank was found to be adequately defended.
3) Finally, the plan required the bombing of aircraft production factories (8, 233 ). An important feature of the German air war plan was night attacks against aircraft plants. Daylight raids tended to suffer greater losses. The poor level of accuracy of the night bombing generally hampered the effectiveness of such attacks. Even so, the Germans were right to attack those targets but wrong to defer the attacks to the last moment (8, 227) . If attacks against those targets had begun shortly after the fall of France, the effects would have been much more significant and possibly hadn an impact on the final outcome.
On 12 August 1940, the Germans attacked and damaged five radar stations, one of which was not put back into operation for 11 days (8, 223 ). This was a significant achievement and would have been even more so if the Germans had continued to attack this set of targets. However, German commanders did not know "the role that radar played in the system…. It was assumed that Fighter Command fought a decentralized battle, with squadrons tied to the radio range of their individual stations, attacks on radar were not given high enough priority" (20, 79) .
Just three days after their successful attack the Luftwaffe largely abandoned radar targets.
After 24 August, the Luftwaffe began attacks on the sector stations, which performed an im- In retrospect, the factors that undermined the effectiveness of the German air campaign were largely self-inflicted. Many of the targets attacked were of secondary importance, and no target set, "whether airfields, communications, ports or industry, was attacked repeatedly, systematically, or accurately" (20, 115) . Failure of the Luftwaffe to press attacks against these targets allowed the RAF to recover and continue the fight.
IV. Unity of Effort
According to the Doctrine for Joint Operations, "unity of effort…requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective" (13, A-2). In the confusion, the Germans failed in at least three joint planning facets that made Operation SEA LION an impossible mission. First, unity of command had to be maintained to properly focus German military power on its last remaining enemy. Also, a new commander's intent had to be announced to the armed forces in view of the unanticipated early fall of France. Consequently, a new concept of operations had to be drafted to achieve the revised end-state.
A. Unity of Command
During the Second World War, Hitler was both the political and military leader of Germany.
He often blurred the strategic, operational, and even tactical levels of command, usually becom-ing involved in all aspects of a military campaign. He forced unity of effort using OKW to coordinate the Army, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, providing them strategic and operational direction. The German military was not a well-oiled joint system, and Hitler's involvement was usually necessary to overcome service rivalries (18, 51).
Throughout the war, there was friction between OKW, OKH, and the Luftwaffe. This was due to the establishment of OKW to oversee the service branches and the creation of the Luft- Initially, the German intent was to subdue Britain through slow, "long term economic warfare…using the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to cut her supply lines" (7, 218) . No serious consideration was given to an amphibious assault on the English coast, and the end-state against 
C. Concept of Operations
The British and Germans recalled that on 9 April 1940, with airborne troops in the vanguard, a German ground force had been successfully transported by sea to conquer Norway (17, 29).
The Royal Navy was initially surprised but eventually punished the smaller Kriegsmarine. The
German surface fleet lost nearly half its strength in vessels sunk or seriously damaged, but accomplished its mission of delivering troops into poorly defended Norwegian harbors; no beach assaults were conducted. Ultimately, lack of adequate Norwegian defenses and the unchallenged powerful Luftwaffe decided the battle in Germany's favor (23, 111).
The lesson drawn by both the British and Germans was that amphibious operations were possible when under an air force umbrella and despite a weak navy (10, 27 ). In addition, the Kriegsmarine's after-action reports indicate that in the Norwegian campaign there was "smooth cooperation between the three services" (10, 26). That was one lesson the Germans did not incorporate as they prepared for SEA LION.
Notwithstanding the poor materiel condition of the British Army, the Germans faced a much tougher task in Operation SEA LION. Without amphibious assault experience, the planning resembled a large river crossing. In fact, 1,910 river barges to be towed by 419 tugs were gathered in preparation to ferry troops to the beaches. The plan envisioned soldiers moving from the barges into fast riverine assault craft for the initial assault wave. Later waves would have the barges move heavy equipment directly onto the beach, although the hope was for the early capture of a functioning port. Airborne troops would be employed for this task and once again be the vanguard of the invasion force. Above all, the crossing was dependent on calm weather. The flat bottoms of the barges would be swamped and risk sinking in anything beyond sea state 3.
Furthermore, the Germans knew that unlike Norway, England would thoroughly oppose this undertaking (19, 155).
Despite Norway, Hitler appeared to have "no stomach for amphibious operations" (19, 159) .
He allowed dubious compromises to be made between the service branches. For example, in order to deter the Royal Navy, the Kriegsmarine proposed landings on a narrow front. This would allow better concentration of their submarines, torpedo boats, and defensive mine fields to guard the flanks of the ground assault waves, crossing from Calais to Dover (the shortest distance), against the expected Royal Navy onslaught. On the contrary, the German Army preferred to assault on a broad front (the whole length of the English southern coast) to avoid giving the British the opportunity to contain a narrow beachhead (17, 92).
The German Army was concerned that the 200.000-man BEF that had escaped from Dunkirk and possibly additional ground forces from Britain's vast empire would bottle up the beachhead.
However, the Kriegsmarine knew the Royal Navy would sortie into the channel and, if not properly defended, the length of the beachfront would be purely academic. The debate raged with
Hitler vacillating, and instead of a best decision, he allowed an uncomfortable compromise (17, 93) . The initial landings would take place between Bognor and Ramsgate on the coast of England, east of the Isle of Wight; half of the beachfront desired by the Army and probably more than the Kriegsmarine could protect (7, 221).
The one issue where there was absolute agreement among the branches of the Wehrmacht was in the air. The Luftwaffe had to achieve command of the air to then be able to concentrate against the Royal Navy's attempts to interfere with the crossing of troops and supplies. Other- Therefore, one can argue that in fact Operation SEA LION was launched on 13 August 1940.
The first phase was the Luftwaffe's effort to achieve air supremacy over England, Operation EAGLE. 
V. Friendly Nations
In August 1939, as Germany prepared for war, Hitler clearly understood the need for allies and friendly governments to secure the German position in the coming war. Defining the German geopolitical position to his commanders in chief, he said:
There are many factors in our favor at present and they may not last…. Probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people, as I do…. Mussolini's existence is also vital. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty will be no longer certain…. A third personal factor favorable to us is Franco. We can only ask benevolent neutrality from Spain. But even that depends on Franco's personality. All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two or three years. No one knows how long I shall live…. We have no choice; we must act…. Therefore conflict is better now…. (11, 24) This positive state of affairs was even more in favor of Germany upon the conclusion of the dramatically successful campaign in France. This event coupled to the Nazi-Soviet Non- 
VI. Conclusions
Three days after he ranted to an audience of thousands "I am coming! I am coming!" Hitler concentrated his air offensive on the city of London, saving the Royal Air Force from mortal attrition and undermining German air strategy (8, 132) . Hitler would never again seriously contemplate an invasion. What caused Germany to abandon its plans to invade? As is shown in the preceding analysis, Operation SEA LION failed before it even started due to Germany's inability to achieve unity of effort, failure to remain focused on key operational centers of gravity, and unwillingness to exploit the capabilities of friendly nations.
A. Failure to Achieve Unity of Effort
Despite the brilliance of Blitzkrieg warfare, as already discussed, the German military had serious shortcomings regarding joint operations. Directive 16 indicates that independent service planning was doctrinal, and it was up to Hitler through OKW to bring the three services into compliance regarding a common plan. However, when Hitler chose to avoid the planning process as he did for SEA LION, OKW did not have the power to force unity. Therefore, it appears that no one was jointly planning the war long-term, but instead the services did so crisis to crisis.
In fact, one sees that SEA LION was crisis action planning due to a shortsighted desired endstate against Britain. While Germany forced a decision through force of arms on France, Hitler based his end-state against Britain on the "hope" that Britain would sue for peace. This may be why he allowed the BEF to escape from France. No one had the foresight to see in the BEF an obstacle to a future invasion of Britain because at that instant none was planned. Thus, when the British chose to continue the war, the Wehrmacht was unprepared for amphibious operations, yet was tasked to carry them out.
B. Lost Focus on the Center of Gravity
Germany's approach to attacking the British centers of gravity suffered from both indecision and impatience. It may never be known if a more concerted effort to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk, or Germany's plans to deter the Royal Navy using coastal artillery, maritime minefields, and air power would have led to a successful invasion. But the risks posed by the British Army and Navy, while significant, paled in comparison to those posed by the Royal Air Force, and
Germany's failure to defeat that COG and achieve air supremacy forced Hitler to call off the operation.
In this regard, evidence suggests that Germany correctly identified the RAF as the most critical COG, and in fact identified and attacked many of the operational centers of gravity that could have led to the defeat of the RAF, including the aircraft factories, radar and sector stations, and other supporting infrastructure that sustained or supported the RAF's warfighting capability. But bombing of aircraft production plants and support installations should have begun much earlier to have a significant impact during the planned invasion; and bombing of the radar stations, sector stations and other operational COGs that were crucial to day-to-day employment of the RAF was not sustained long enough to effectively degrade those systems. As a result, the RAF was able to recover from the attacks, continue the fight, and eventually win the Battle of Britain.
C. Failure to Include Allies
When Italy entered the war, Mediterranean opportunities became available to the Axis powers, but their failure to achieve unity of effort led to eventual defeat in the Western Desert without ever affecting Operation EAGLE or planning for Operation SEA LION. In addition, the Command and paved the way for a German invasion from the sea. As it was, German numerical superiority was such that by mid-September 1940 command of the air was within grasp. Had
Hitler and the Luftwaffe remained focused on these targets instead of redirecting the effort to a militarily insignificant terror bombing of London, the outcome of the Battle of Britain, and consequently also Operation SEA LION, might well have been very different.
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